LCCR STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES ON ELECTRONIC VOTING
March 2004

The Leadership Conference on Civil Rights (LCCR), the nation's oldest, largest and most diverse civil and human rights coalition, has a very strong interest in preventing the disenfranchisement of voters, and in ensuring that the elections in 2004 and beyond are not marred by the same kind of chaos that contributed to the disastrous outcome in 2000.

Many of the reforms mandated by the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA) will help in reaching this goal, if the new law is adequately funded and its provisions are implemented in a fair manner.  At the same time, the new types of voting technology being implemented as a result of HAVA - Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) voting systems and Precinct-Count Optical Scan systems - raise questions about voter access and ballot security that must be addressed in order to ensure the confidence of voters in the outcome of elections.

IMPORTANCE OF ELECTRONIC VOTING (DIRECT RECORDING ELECTRONIC SYSTEMS, OR "DRES")

In 2000, as many as 2 million voters left the polling place believing that their votes would be counted, but because of obsolete and inaccurate voting systems, they were not.  And in California's recent recall election, punch card systems failed to record a valid vote, on the question of whether to recall the governor, on 6.3 percent of all ballots cast.  For optical scan systems, the rate was 2.7 percent.  Yet on DREs, the rate was only 1.5 percent.  The differences in the rates of error are so dramatic they cannot be explained on any ground other than the voting equipment used.  Regrettably, more than 70 percent of Americans will cast their votes in the 2004 election on the same kinds of voting systems that have produced higher rates of error. 

It is essential to modernize voting systems so that every vote can be counted and so that Americans can have confidence in the outcome of their elections.  Of the voting systems available today, DREs clearly have the lowest rates of error, thereby assuring that voters can leave the polling place with confidence that their votes will be counted.  In addition, DREs are the only voting equipment that are fully accessible, allowing all voters, including persons with disabilities, to cast secret and independent ballots.  DREs can also handle multiple languages, making it easier for election officials to accommodate Limited English Proficient (LEP) individuals.  In addition, the millions of Americans who face literacy challenges are able to take advantage of the audio features of DREs to cast independent votes without embarrassment. 

REFORMING THE NATION'S VOTING SYSTEMS

The Leadership Conference on Civil Rights believes that three principles must guide the decisions made in reforming the nation's voting systems, whether through the purchase or lease of new voting machines, the operation of new or existing voting systems, or the design of future machines. Voting machines and systems must provide for:

• non-discrimination,
• "second-chance voting" and voter verification, and
• compliance with national certification standards.

NON-DISCRIMINATION

The lynchpin of any civil rights protection is that voting machines must not result in any discrimination.  Older voting machines have been shown to have differential error rates depending on the characteristics of voters, including income level and education level.  Persons with disabilities have historically been forced to vote separately, but never equally, with voting systems that don't allow them to cast a secret ballot or to vote independently.  Persons with limited English proficiency have also been prevented from equal voting by machines and balloting systems that don't recognize their needs. 

Currently, only DREs are able to provide full equality to persons with disabilities or limited English proficiency.  In addition, DREs have lower error rates for historically disenfranchised populations, as described above. 

"SECOND-CHANCE VOTING" AND VOTER VERIFICATION

"Second-chance voting" is one of the key reforms pushed by the civil rights community for inclusion in the Help America Vote Act (HAVA).  For the first time, this requirement provides that a voter must be able to review his or her ballot before it is officially cast and counted, and must be given the opportunity to change the ballot or receive a new one.  This is the requirement for voter verification. 

DREs meet the voter verification provision by requiring the voter to review the ballot.  They also easily allow the voter to make changes to the ballot before it is cast, and this is done within the secrecy of the voting booth.  Optical-scan and other paper-based systems require the issuance of new ballots if the voter wishes to make a change, and often the review process in not carried out privately, undermining the secrecy of the ballot. 

Suggestions have been made to add a paper-based voter verification system to DRE machines.  This is known as the "voter verified paper trail" or VVPT.  These systems are not certified (see below), and raise concerns about the history of lost, mangled, and manipulated paper ballots, as well as the difficulty of recounting paper ballots accurately.  New systems of electronic voter verification are under development, and these systems would not have the drawback of undermining full and equal access for persons with disabilities and other historically underrepresented voters. 

In whatever ways "second chance voting" or voter verification is carried out, LCCR believes that two points are absolutely essential.

• First, any system used must be uniform and nondiscriminatory, accommodating citizens who require alternative languages and providing accessibility to people with disabilities. 
• Second, the use of the system must not create additional undue burdens on pollworkers and election administrators, who already conduct elections with insufficient resources and an overwhelming number of duties that must be performed.

COMPLIANCE WITH NATIONAL CERTIFICATION STANDARDS

Approximately 40 states require that voting machines meet federal standards before they can be certified for use in the state.  Certification standards serve a number of vital functions.  Federal standards protect voters through such requirements as the new "second chance voting" provision.  They deal with such issues as reliability, audit techniques, and security standards that are basic to ensuring that the voter's vote will be effective.  Certification also protects state and local governments from voting machine manufacturers by providing technical specifications, testing and reliability measures, and operational standards. The national standards exist to ensure that a vote in California is as likely to be counted as a vote in Virginia, and they cover an extremely wide range of physical and administrative issues pertaining to the machines.

It is through the national certification standards that policy goals and technical specifications are brought together.  Bypassing the certification process undermines the important protections that ensure that voting systems meet basic accuracy, security and access goals.  

VVPT systems are not certified.  Some of the basic issues that would need to be addressed for VVPT systems are listed below, but a question remains whether they can provide for equal access to a secret ballot, and whether additional new systems of electronic verification would better protect civil rights and voting rights.  VVPTs must address questions such as:

• How many ballots must a printer produce without a paper jam or a mechanical breakdown?
• What kind of paper is to be used in the printers?
• What is the temperature range within which the machine must perform flawlessly?
• How many times can the printer be dropped, and from what height, and still operate?
• How will the VVPT printer be connected to the DRE?
• What is the size and type of font to be used to ensure readability?
• How will the paper records be counted?
• How does the printer present the information to the voter, in a manner which preserves accessibility and secrecy?
• How will a voter verify or refuse to verify the paper record, and how will the electronic record be managed?
• What safeguards will be put in place to protect against lost, mangled and manipulated paper records?

Regardless of the merits or drawbacks of VVPT systems, LCCR believes it is simply unrealistic to expect that they could be implemented in time for the 2004 election, and it is unlikely that they will even be available in time for the 2008 election.  New systems for electronic verification would provide civil rights safeguards in addition as part of the voter verification process, and these should receive attention in the future.  There are, however, a number of steps that can be taken now to improve voting machine security and thereby build voter confidence.

Security Concerns with DREs & Voter Verification of Ballots Like all voting technologies, DREs are not immune to malfunctions or security threats.  As with all other current systems, steps should be taken to improve their reliability, access and security.  In response to public concerns about the potential for security problems, for example, the states of Ohio and Maryland commissioned independent studies to examine DREs and the manner in which they are used, with an eye towards security improvements.  The agencies made specific recommendations to increase security, with guidelines that were specific to the machines, and which covered not only software and hardware but also election administration procedures.  Both states are implementing the recommendations and moving forward with the use of DREs, as are many other jurisdictions, meaning that fewer voters will be casting their ballots on older, obsolete systems in this November's election. 

IMPROVING SECURITY

LCCR believes that it is appropriate to take additional measures to assure voters that their ballots are being cast and counted properly.  It is essential to recognize that voting machines do not exist in a vacuum.  DREs can work accurately and effectively but, like all voting systems, require adequate procedural safeguards and management systems in order to prevent tampering or malfunctions.  While a comprehensive list of recommended security measures for DRE implementation is beyond the scope of this paper, and ultimately requires guidance from the National Institute of Standards and Technology under the supervision of the newly-formed Election Assistance Commission, a sensible approach should include steps such as:

• Use of certified systems. There have been reports of manufacturers or vendors installing uncertified software or hardware, bypassing review by election officials. This violates one of the most basic security protections.
• Clear procedures for polling place operations.
• Isolation of individual machines, which prevents any potential vulnerability in one machine from being used to access and alter the programming of other machines. Wireless or Internet connections are a particular problem.
• Prohibiting vote tallies from being transmitted via phone lines or the Internet, which prevents a hacker from using those avenues to gain access to the voting system.
• Restrictions on physical access to voting equipment, including monitoring of users, etc.
• Equipment management practices.
• Development and implementation of statewide security plans, binding on local jurisdictions, including dedication of security personnel to monitoring, testing and prevention.
• Testing, during certification, upon delivery, prior to Election Day, and on Election Day.
• Parallel monitoring, in which machines are randomly taken out of service and tested on Election Day, in order to detect the presence of any "Trojan Horse" code that might time.
• Ensuring that election officials maintain control over ballot creation and loading onto the voting machines.

OTHER WAYS TO ENSURE FAIR AND ACCURATE ELECTIONS

The debate over voting systems has taken the nation's eye off a number of grave and widespread threats to the integrity of elections.  Foremost among these threats is the accuracy of the voter registration rolls themselves.  As a result of HAVA, every state must develop a new statewide voter registration database by 2004, with a waiver to 2006.  This is crucial because problems with existing databases disenfranchised far more Americans in the 2000 election than problems with voting equipment.  The databases must guarantee that the eligibility of a lawfully registered voter is not challenged on Election Day due to inappropriate and illegal purging, errors in data entry, or the inability to easily and accurately access the database at the polling place.

Another one million votes were lost on Election Day in 2000 because of polling place operations and insufficient pollworker training, a problem that especially impacts minority and disabled voters, who too often experience attitudinal barriers that discourage and even prevent them from voting.  Because of Bush v. Gore, HAVA and other federal voting rights laws, states must ensure that the same procedures are used at all polling places statewide, within each polling place, and at each registration agency.  Effective training, using the best methods available from adult education systems, should be designed to ensure this result.  In addition, recruiting a diverse and large enough number of poll workers is a continuing challenge that must be met.

Finally, voter education is crucial, particularly in light of the new procedures established under HAVA.  For instance, voters must be educated on such matters as their right to a provisional ballot when their eligibility has been disputed.  The provisional ballot is a new right in 35 states.  Similarly, voters must be educated on the correct way to cast votes on the particular systems that are being used in their communities, which in many areas are new.  Most importantly, HAVA and the laws of some states impose new identification requirements on many voters, requirements that place disproportionate burdens on members of minority and disabled communities.  In order to prevent problems and even outright discrimination, voters must be made aware of what forms of identification are acceptable in their polling place.

NEXT STEPS

Consistent with Section 221 of the Help America Vote Act (HAVA), the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights calls on the newly-formed Election Assistance Commission to task the Technical Guidance Development Committee, chaired by the National Institute of Standards and Technology, to examine concerns with the security of computers, computer networks, and computer data storage used in voting systems; methods to detect and prevent fraud; the protection of voter privacy; the role of human factors in the design and application of voting systems; and remote access voting.  The LCCR calls on the Election Assistance Commission and the Technical Guidance Development Committee to publish recommendations on the best methods and action steps for ensuring non-discrimination; "second-chance voting" and voter verification; and compliance with national certification standards for the nation's voting systems. 

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