Statement of Principles on Electronic Voting

February 17, 2004

Leadership Conference on Civil Rights

The Leadership Conference on Civil Rights (LCCR), the nation's oldest, largest, and most diverse civil and human rights coalition, is committed to preventing the disenfranchisement of voters and ensuring that the elections in 2004 and beyond are not marred by the same kind of chaos that contributed to the disastrous problems of 2000.

Many of the reforms mandated by the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA) will help in reaching these goals, if the new law is adequately funded and if its provisions are implemented in a fair manner. Properly implemented, HAVA will go a long way to address problems involving voter registration, polling place operations, insufficient voter education, the lack of accessibility, and outdated and inaccurate voting equipment.

One of the components of HAVA is the replacement of older voting systems with newer types of voting technology -- particularly direct recording electronic ("DRE") systems. Newer systems have many advantages over older systems and will ensure that more votes are accurately counted. As with all revolutions in voting technology, however, instilling voter confidence in the security of these new machines has proven difficult, though voters who have used the systems report a high degree of satisfaction. DRE systems are especially complex devices, and security concerns among voters must be addressed. The task of building voter confidence has been made even more difficult due to a number of highly-publicized and alarming missteps by a leading manufacturer, as well as several reports of administrative and technical glitches in the early use of the machines. Given these challenges, LCCR believes that it is appropriate to take additional measures to improve security and to assure voters that their ballots are being cast and counted properly. These measures, however, must be consistent with important civil rights principles, and must not divert our attention away from a number of other critical issues that have had a drastic impact on our most important and cherished civil right of all: the right to vote and to have that vote counted.

THE IMPORTANCE OF ELECTRONIC VOTING

In 2000, as many as 2 million voters left the polling place believing that their votes would be counted, but because of obsolete and inaccurate voting systems, they were not. And in California's recent recall election, punch card systems failed to record a valid vote, on the question of whether to recall the governor, on 6.3 percent of all ballots cast. For optical scan systems, this rate was 2.7 percent. Yet on DREs, the rate was only 1.5 percent. The differences in the rates of error are dramatic, and simply cannot be explained on any ground other than the voting equipment used. Regrettably, more than 70 percent of Americans will cast their votes in the 2004 election on the same kinds of voting systems that have produced higher rates of error.

It is essential to modernize voting systems so that every vote can be counted and so that Americans can have confidence in the outcomes of elections. Of the voting systems available today, DREs have the lowest rates of error, thereby assuring that voters can leave the polling place with confidence that their votes will be counted. In addition, DREs are the only voting equipment that is fully accessible, allowing all voters, including persons with disabilities, to cast secret and independent ballots. DREs can also handle multiple languages, making it easier for election officials to accommodate individuals with limited English proficiency. In addition, the millions of Americans who face literacy challenges are able to take advantage of the audio features of DREs to cast independent votes without embarrassment.

GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR REFORMING THE NATION'S VOTING SYSTEMS

The Leadership Conference on Civil Rights believes that three principles must guide the decisions made in reforming the nation's voting systems, whether through the purchase or lease of new voting machines, the operation of new or existing voting systems, or the design of future machines. Voting machines and systems must provide for: a) Non-Discrimination;
b) "Second-Chance Voting" and Voter Verification; and
c) Compliance with National Certification Standards.

A. Non-Discrimination

The linchpin of any civil rights protection is that voting machines must not result in any discrimination. Older voting machines have repeatedly been shown to have varying rates of error depending on the characteristics of voters, including socioeconomic status and education level. Persons with disabilities have historically been forced to vote separately, but never equally, with voting systems that don't allow them to cast a secret ballot or to vote independently. Persons with limited English proficiency have also been prevented from having equal access to voting by machines and balloting systems that don't recognize their needs.

Only electronic voting systems are able to provide full equality to people with disabilities or limited English proficiency. In addition, DREs have lower error rates for historically disenfranchised populations, as described above.

B. Second-Chance Voting" and Voter Verification

"Second-chance voting" is one of the key reforms that were pushed by the civil rights community for inclusion in the Help America Vote Act (HAVA). As a result, HAVA requires for the first time that a voter must be able to review his or her ballot before it is officially cast and counted, and must be given the opportunity to change the ballot or receive a new one. This is the requirement for voter verification.

DREs meet the voter verification provision by requiring the voter to review the ballot prior to officially casting his or her vote via a final review screen. DREs also easily allow the voter to make changes to the ballot before it is cast, and this is done within the secrecy of the voting booth. Optical-scan and other paper-based systems require the issuance of new ballots if the voter wishes to make a change, and often the review process is not carried out privately, undermining the secrecy of the ballot.

Suggestions have been made to add a paper-based voter verification system to DRE machines. This is known as the "voter verified paper trail" or VVPT. These systems are not certified (see below), and raise concerns given the history of lost, mangled, and manipulated paper ballots, as well as the difficulty of recounting paper ballots accurately. New systems of electronic voter verification are under development, and these would have the additional advantage of preserving full and equal access for people with disabilities or other historically underrepresented voters.

In whatever ways "second chance voting" or voter verification is carried out, LCCR believes that two points are absolutely essential. * First, any system used must be uniform and nondiscriminatory, accommodating citizens who require alternative languages and ensuring accessibility for people with disabilities to an independent and secret ballot.

C. Compliance with National Certification Standards

Approximately 40 states require that voting machines meet federal standards before they can be certified for use in the state. Certification standards serve a number of vital functions. Federal standards protect voters through such requirements as the new "second chance voting" provision. They deal with such issues as reliability, audit techniques, and security standards that are basic to ensuring that voters' ballots will be properly counted. Certification also assists state and local governments in the selection and implementation of voting systems by providing technical specifications, testing and reliability measures, and operational standards, and helps ensure that they are not excessively reliant upon voting machine manufacturers. National standards exist to ensure that a vote in California is just as likely to be counted as a vote in Virginia, and they cover an extremely wide range of physical and administrative issues.

It is through the national certification standards that policy goals and technical specifications are brought together. Bypassing the certification process undermines the important protections that ensure that voting systems meet basic accuracy, security and access goals.

VVPT systems are not certified, and it is simply unrealistic to expect that they could be certified in time for the 2004 election. Some of the basic issues that would need to be addressed for VVPT systems are listed below, but a question remains whether they can provide for equal access to a secret ballot, and whether additional new systems of electronic verification would better protect civil rights and voting rights. VVPTs must address questions such as:

While these issues are being addressed, including the development of technology such as electronic verification, there are a number of steps that can be taken now to improve voting machine security and thereby build voter confidence prior to the 2004 elections.

ADDRESSING SECURITY CONCERNS WITH DRES

Like all voting technologies, DREs are not immune to malfunctions or security threats. As with all systems, steps should be taken to improve their reliability, access and security. In response to public concerns about the potential for security problems, for example, the states of Ohio and Maryland commissioned independent studies to examine DREs and the manner in which they are used, with an eye towards security improvements. The agencies made specific recommendations to increase security, with guidelines that were specific to the machines, and which covered not only software and hardware but also election administration procedures. Both states are implementing the recommendations and moving forward with the use of DREs, as are many other jurisdictions, meaning that fewer voters will be casting their ballots on older, obsolete systems in this November's election.

LCCR believes that it is appropriate to take additional measures to assure voters that their ballots are being cast and counted properly. It is essential to recognize that voting machines do not exist in a vacuum, but are a critical part of the election system. It is the overall effectiveness of the election administration system as a whole - from voter registration to pollworker training to Election Day management - that fundamentally ensures that every eligible voter has the opportunity to vote and to have that vote counted. DREs can work accurately and effectively, but like all voting systems, they require adequate procedural safeguards and management systems in order to prevent tampering or malfunctions. While a comprehensive list of security recommendations for DRE implementation is beyond the scope of this paper, and ultimately requires guidance from the National Institute of Standards and Technology under the supervision of the newly-formed Election Assistance Commission, sensible measures should include:

SOUND TECHNOLOGY IS ONLY ONE ASPECT OF ENSURING FAIR AND ACCURATE ELECTIONS

The debate over voting systems has taken the nation's eye off a number of grave and widespread threats to the integrity of elections. Foremost among these threats is the accuracy of the voter registration rolls themselves. As a result of HAVA, every state must develop a new statewide voter registration database by 2004, with a waiver to 2006. This requirement is crucial because problems with existing databases disenfranchised far more Americans in the 2000 election than problems with voting equipment. The databases must guarantee that the eligibility of a lawfully registered voter is not challenged on Election Day due to inappropriate and illegal purging, errors in data entry, or the inability to easily and accurately access the database at the polling place.

Another one million votes were lost on Election Day in 2000 because of polling place operations and insufficient pollworker training, a problem that especially impacts minority and disabled voters - who too often experience attitudinal barriers that discourage and even prevent them from voting. Under Bush v. Gore, HAVA and other federal voting rights laws, states must ensure that the same procedures are used at all polling places statewide, within each polling place, and at each registration agency. Effective training, using the best methods available from adult education systems, should be designed to ensure this result. In addition, recruiting a diverse and large enough number of poll workers is a continuing challenge that must be met.

Finally, voter education is crucial, particularly in light of the new procedures established under HAVA. For instance, voters must be educated on such matters as their right to a provisional ballot when their eligibility has been challenged. The provisional ballot is a new right in 35 states. Similarly, voters must be educated on the correct way to cast votes on the particular systems that are being used in their communities, which in many areas are new. Most importantly, HAVA and the laws of some states impose new identification requirements on many voters, requirements that place disproportionate burdens on members of minority and disabled communities. In order to prevent problems and even outright discrimination, voters must be made aware of what forms of identification are acceptable in their polling place and poll workers must be trained to implement the new requirements properly and non- discriminatorily.

NEXT STEPS

Consistent with Section 221 of the Help America Vote Act (HAVA), the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights calls on the newly-formed Election Assistance Commission to task the Technical Guidance Development Committee, chaired by the National Institute of Standards and Technology, with taking the lead in examining concerns relating to the security of computers, computer networks, and computer data storage used in voting systems; methods to detect and prevent fraud; the protection of voter privacy; the role of human factors in the design and application of voting systems; and remote access voting. The LCCR calls on the Election Assistance Commission and the Technical Guidance Development Committee to publish recommendations on the best methods and action steps for ensuring non- discrimination; "second-chance voting" and voter verification; and compliance with national certification standards for the nation's voting systems.

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